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THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR CITIZEN INFORMATION 
AND A LOCAL MARKET FOR PUBLIC GOODS 
Tn their 1993 article in this Review, Paul Teske, Mark Schneider, Michael Mintrom, and Samuel 
f Best sought to establish the microfoundations for a model of a competitive market for public 
5 services between local governments in polycentric regions. An important part of their model 
focused on subgroups of informed citizens, especially recent movers. Theoretical analysis was 
supplemented by an empirical study of the factors shaping accuracy of Long Island homeowners' 
information about relative expenditures and tax rates of their school districts. David Lowery, W. E. 
Lyons and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog criticize the relevance of this empirical evidence, suggesting the 
atypical nature of education as a service (especially in this site) and challenging the sufficiency of the 
demonstrated levels of information for generating a competitive market. Teske and his colleagues reply 
by pointing out the general importance of education throughout American local policymaking and by 
defending the relevance of their measures and conclusions for their market model. 
COMMENT 
Teske, Schneider, Mintrom, and Best (1993) have 
provided us with a new interpretation of the mic- 
rolevel foundations of the Tiebout model (1956). 
Replacing Tiebout's untenable assumptions of perfect 
information and perfect mobility, they argue that 
marginal consumers-those entering a jurisdiction 
who are highly attentive to public goods and servic- 
es-are sufficiently influential to generate a public 
goods quasi market and its attendant efficiency ad- 
vantages. Obviously, this more realistic interpreta- 
tion has rather profound implications for how we 
organize the provision of local public goods and 
services. 
Science, however, entails more than presenting a 
new idea. Evidence also must be presented to estab- 
lish, however tentatively, its truth status. But the 
proponents of a theory are often poor judges of such 
evidence. Being human, we are all too susceptible to 
any number of inadvertent errors of interpretation. 
Accordingly, as noted by philosopher of science 
David Hull, "The self-correction so important to 
science does not depend on scientists presenting 
totally unbiased results but on other scientists, with 
different biases, checking them" (1988, 321). In that 
spirit we reexamine the evidence presented by Teske 
and his colleagues in support of their model. The 
potential importance of their work justifies this exam- 
ination. It is also justified because it illustrates well 
the ways-some trivial and some not-in which 
biases may infect the selection and interpretation of 
evidence. Thus, we provide a cautionary tale about 
the very human enterprise of science. 
TESTING THE MODEL 
To assess the truth status of the model offered by 
Teske and colleagues, we need estimates of two 
quantities: (1) how many informed consumers of local 
government services there are and (2) how many 
informed consumers are required to produce a mar- 
ket. The model will be supported if the first propor- 
tion is greater than or equal to the second. On both 
sides of the comparison, Teske and colleagues shape 
the data to support their model. 
Estimates of Informed Public Goods Consumers 
Numbers of informed consumers are inflated in four 
ways. First, they examine only education. Critics of 
Tiebout have long admitted that citizens are highly 
attentive to education when compared to other local 
services. For this reason, we excluded education from 
our analysis of two Kentucky urban areas in which 
we challenge the empirical foundations of the public 
choice approach to local public goods provision, 
thereby conceding that the unusual salience of local 
education may generate marketlike traits (Lyons, 
Lowery, and DeHoog 1992). More to the point, to test 
a model that purports to be generally applicable to 
local service provision, Teske and colleagues select 
the best possible case for their analysis. 
Even more troubling is the characterization of those 
who know the relative standing of their district's 
school spending-whether it is average, above aver- 
age, or below average relative to others on Long 
Island-as informed. This is equivalent to saying that 
knowing the relative ordering in average price of 
BMWs, Fords, and Hondas makes one a fully in- 
formed consumer of automobiles. With this measure, 
Teske and colleagues have set the criterion level for 
being an informed consumer at an absurdly unchal- 
lenging level. 
Third, they fail to report a salient fact about Long 
Island school districts-that they hold annual refer- 
enda on spending. As Inman reported in an article 
they cite, "The fifty-eight Long Island school dis- 
tricts . . . determines its [sic] current expenditures 
per pupil via an annual budget referendum. Fall 
budgets are submitted by the school board to the 
voters for approval in the prior spring" (Inman 1978, 
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54). Few states do this for school spending, and 
virtually no jurisdictions do so for other services- 
fire, police, parks, and so on. This highly unusual 
annual cue must surely raise information levels about 
education spending. Whatever the merits of this 
practice, it should be obvious that it makes the case of 
Long Island school spending highly unusual in a way 
that seriously undermines the generalizability of the 
findings to almost all local public choice problems. 
Fourth and most seriously, Teske and colleagues 
profoundly mischaracterize the citizen's choice prob- 
lem in order to make the data support their theory. 
Their focus on the single service of education is 
essential if their later use of findings on the role of 
marginal consumers of private goods is to have any 
validity. But the local public goods market is not 
organized this way. When one "buys" a local school 
district, one also purchases through location in a 
municipality police services, fire protection, street 
lighting, sanitation services, and so on. It is as if 
when purchasing a sofa, one automatically pur- 
chased as well a television set, a refrigerator, and a 
car. Tiebout fully recognized this by emphasizing 
patterns of revenue expenditure that encompass all of the 
goods, services, and costs associated with residing in 
a locality. And Teske and colleagues at one point 
refer to "the complicated package of local public 
goods that Tiebout's shoppers purchase along with 
their residential location" (p. 705). But they failed to 
recognize its implication that they must do more to 
support their model than find that 20% of consumers 
are "informed" about education. They must demon- 
strate that 20% are "informed" about education, and 
police services, and fire protection, and sanitation, and 
taxes, and all of the other items comprising the local 
tax and service package. 
Estimates of a Market Threshold 
The evidence they employ to define a threshold at 
which the proportion of informed marginal consum- 
ers is sufficient to generate a market is just as weak. 
Four sources are cited, all flawed in one manner or 
another (p. 709). 
The weakest is their reference to Senator Paul 
Douglas's argument that a competitive market will 
develop if only 10% of consumers are informed. 
Wilde and Schwartz are cited as the source of this 
claim, but Teske and colleagues omit the full quote: 
"Senator Douglas, the principal legislative supporter 
of [Truth in Lending Law], asserted, unfortunately 
without explanation, that a competitive market would 
exist if 'only' 10 percent of the consumers were cost 
conscious" (Wilde and Schwartz 1979, 543; emphasis 
ours). What appears to be evidence, then, is simply 
an unsupported and politically motivated assertion. 
Their second source is Inman's (1978) test of the 
median voter model with data on spending referen- 
dums for Long Island school districts. They report 
that Inman "showed that a highly informed set of 
voters, making up about 13 percent of the popula- 
tion, was ahle to make local school budgets respond 
to their preferences" (1993, 709). But Teske and 
colleagues fail to note that Inman's central finding is 
that these 13% are those around the median income 
level, unlike Teske and colleagues' informed voters, 
who are at the upper end of the income range. They 
employ empirical evidence on apples to support a 
hypothesis about oranges. Indeed, the key implica- 
tion of Inman's study is that it is the median voters 
already residing within districts, not recently arriving 
upper-income consumers, who drive local school 
budgets on Long Island. 
Third, Teske and colleagues cite Thorelli and Engle- 
dow (1980) and Claxton, Fry, and Portis (1974), who 
classify consumers on the basis of information as 
measured by number of store visits when making 
major purchases. But are these classes comparable to 
those used by Teske and colleagues based on knowl- 
edge about relative school spending? The high infor- 
mation group in the Claxton, Fry, and Portis study 
visited an average of 20 furniture stores during which 
they almost certainly gathered more information 
than the relative standing of each firm's median price 
for a couch-the value most comparable to Teske 
and colleagues' measure. And while the poorest- 
informed consumers typically visited only two stores, 
they certainly were able to see more than a single sofa 
in each. Thus the measures of information in the two 
studies of private market consumers surely represent 
something different from what is tapped by Teske 
and colleagues' measure. Yet their argument hinges 
on the comparability of the proportions falling into 
the superficially similar categories of high, medium, 
and low information. Given the qualitative differ- 
ences in these categories across the public and private 
market studies, valid comparisons of proportions are 
simply implausible. 
CONCLUSION 
The truth status of Teske and colleagues' model 
depends on the validity of both sides of the compar- 
ison they wish to make, and on both the evidence 
they cite remains highly questionable. By focusing on 
an uncommonly salient service, by selecting cases 
providing an atypical information cue via annual 
referenda, by using a trivial standard for defining 
high levels of information, and by ignoring the inher- 
ently compound nature of the local public goods 
market, Teske and colleagues have arranged a test 
that can tell us almost nothing about most local public 
choice problems. If anything in their results is sur- 
prising, it is that in so stylized a setting only 19% of 
the respondents could be identified as "highly in- 
formed."' And by failing to provide credible evidence 
about how many informed consumers it takes to 
produce a competitive market, we cannot know if this 
19% is sufficient to generate a public goods quasi 
market. 
While this does not mean that their model is 
invalid, it does imply that it remains untested. Per- 
haps more importantly, our analysis indicates that we 
need to be more cautious in evaluating how propo- 
nents of a theory confront it with data. Being human, 
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we are all too inclined to interpret evidence selec- 
tively when motivated to do so, however inadvert- 
ently. And as David Hull has cautioned, "Any scien- 
tist who is incapable of wriggling a bit will never 
succeed in science, but there are also limits to the 
wriggling. If it becomes too pervasive, the scientist 
ceases to be a scientist" (1988, 281). In our view, Teske 
and his colleagues skate too close to those limits. 
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RESPONSE 
Scientific progress is often contentious. As a recent 
winner of the prestigious John Bates Clark Award in 
economics, Paul Krugman, observed: "In general, if 
people in a field have bogged down on questions that 
seem very hard, it is a good idea to ask whether they 
are really working on the right questions. Often some 
other question is not only easier to answer but 
actually more interesting! (One drawback to this trick 
is that it often gets people angry. An academic who 
has spent years on a hard problem is rarely grateful 
when you suggest that his field can be revived by 
bypassing it)" (1993, 27). Krugman's observation may 
explain the concluding tone of Lowery, Lyons, and 
DeHoog's comment, which introduces a highly per- 
sonalized tone to professional discourse. In this re- 
sponse we address the task of identifying the right 
questions for future scientific examination of jurisdic- 
tional competition. 
Understanding our argument requires a more so- 
phisticated view of markets than held by Lowery, 
Lyons, and DeHoog. By exploring the micro founda- 
tions for macro models of the local market for public 
goods, we address an issue central to the understand- 
ing of competitive markets. Their notion that our 
model is supported only if the number of informed 
consumers is greater than or equal to the number of 
informed consumers required to produce a market 
reduces a complex problem to a trivial and naive 
standard. There are degrees of market competition 
and economists have not developed a divining rod 
that distinguishes "perfectly competitive" markets 
from "perfectly noncompetitive" ones. If there were 
such a simple test, antitrust and other complicated 
market regulation problems would have been re- 
solved long ago. 
Lowery, Lyons, and DeHoog admit that macro 
studies largely show evidence of greater efficiencies 
in more competitive local government settings, a 
Tiebout-like finding. But upon finding scant micro 
evidence in-their own work, they simply give up: 
"This conclusion leaves us with something of a 
mystery" (Lowery and Lyons 1989, 95). In contrast, 
we pursue this critical micro-macro link. In so doing, 
we do not rely narrowly on Tiebout but argue for a 
fuller theoretical model, including the role of respon- 
sive elites and informed business movers, in addition 
to the informed subset of mobile citizen-consumers 
that is the focal point of the research reported in our 
article. (For a fuller development see Schneider and 
Teske, with Mintrom 1995.) 
It is important to note that Lowery, Lyons, and 
DeHoog do not challenge the macro findings of 
Tiebout-based research or our theoretical develop- 
ment of the mover as a marginal consumer. Indeed, 
they do not challenge any other theoretical element of 
our work. Essentially, they argue that we have biased 
the case for finding knowledgeable consumers and 
that we have not established how many consumers 
can be shown to make a market competitive. In the 
next paragraphs, we address these specific concerns. 
Lowery, Lyons, and DeHoog themselves admit that 
some of their concerns are "trivial and some not." We 
will show that this admission is only half right and 
that their comments illustrate a misunderstanding 
both of our model and of markets in general. 
First, Lowery, Lyons, and DeHoog criticize us for 
focusing on an "uncommonly salient" issue, educa- 
tion and urge that schools are only part of a complex 
package of local government. Our simple answer is, 
yes, we do focus on education. We think our choice is 
a better foundation for building theories of the local 
market for public goods than assessing whether or 
not citizens are aware of which level of government 
collects their garbage (which was one of Lowery, 
Lyons, and DeHoog's research questions). 
Education, as the most important locally funded 
public good, makes up the bulk of this market. 
According to the 1987 Census of Governments, local 
government spending for education exceeds local 
spending on streets, water and sewers, parks, librar- 
ies, police, fire, sanitation, housing and community 
development, and transit combined. Even for people 
without children, schools are important because they 
affect home values. To ignore education as a force 
shaping the local market for public goods-as Low- 
ery, Lyons, and DeHoog did in their study in Ken- 
tucky and as they imply we should do in our 
work-is short-sighted. We suspect that their omis- 
sion was motivated more by the fact that with two 
consolidated school districts as the venue for their 
research, they could not test the effects of education. 
Furthermore, current research suggests that the 
findings reported by Lowery and Lyons (1989) are 
anomalous. The political science literature increas- 
ingly is focused on movers as a force in the local 
market for public goods. Recent literature indicates 
that even low-income people are aware of the quality 
of services provided by government and that this 
awareness affects their mobility (Blank 1985; Gram- 
lich and Laren 1984; Peterson and Rom 1989). More 
generally, Sharp (1986) found that local service and 
tax reasons were the most prominent ones cited by 
movers in Kansas City. Percy and Hawkins (1992) 
found considerable evidence of Tiebout-like behavior 
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